Nowadays, all major web browsers have a private browsing mode. However, the mode's benefits and limitations are not particularly understood. Through the use of survey studies, prior work has found that most users are either unaware of private browsing or do not use it. Further, those who do use private browsing generally have misconceptions about what protection it provides.
Introduction
Prior work has extensively explored users' online privacy concerns when using the Internet [1, 6, 23, 34, [40] [41] [42] [43] . For example, a survey of 1,002 US respondents (conducted by * The study was conducted while the author was an intern at Brave Software.
the Pew Research Center in 2013) found that respondents were concerned about their personal information being available online [43] . Respondents also felt strongly about controlling who had access to their behavioural data and communications content, including family members, partners, friends, employers, advertisers, and government agencies. In 2015, Angulo and Ortlieb conducted a user study to investigate users' concerns with regards to "online privacy-related panic" incidents [6] . They identified 18 different incidents that would make participants panic or distress. Online tracking, reputation loss, and financial harm were the most frequently reported incidents by participants.
Prior work has also found that users are willing to take measures to protect their online privacy. In the same Pew Research Center survey [43] , a clear majority (86%) of respondents reported they had taken steps to remove or hide their "digital footprints," including clearing their browsing history and cookies. Further, Kang et al. conducted a user study to investigate how users would react to security and privacy risks [31] ; 77% of non-technical participants reported taking several measures to protect their "digital traces," including the use of private browsing mode.
As we can see, users have serious concerns about their online privacy, and try to employ different strategies or use different privacy-enhancing tools to protect it. In this work, we focus on evaluating the end-user experience of one of these tools: private browsing. Private browsing is a privacyenhancing technology that allows a user to browse the Internet without saving information about the websites they visited in private mode on their local device. As of today, all major web browsers have a private browsing mode.
Prior user studies have quantitatively -mainly through survey studies -investigated whether users are aware of private browsing, what they use it for, and whether they understand what protection it provides [10, 16, 25, 29, 35, 55] . However, prior work has not investigated why most users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing. In this work, we address this research gap by designing and conducting a two-part user study with 20 demographically-diverse participants. First, we conduct a qualitative, interview-based study to explore users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals. We find participants' conceptual understanding of the term "private browsing" influenced their mental models and usage of private mode in real life. Further, almost all participants did not understand the primary security goal of private browsing. Alarmingly, we found that all participants who used private mode performed their private browsing activities while being authenticated to their personal online account.
Second, we perform a participatory design study to investigate whether existing browser disclosures, the full-page explanations browsers present when users open a new private tab or window in private mode, communicate the security goals of private browsing to users. We ask participants to critique the browser disclosures of Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome, and then design new ones. We find that none of the three disclosures communicates the primary security goal of private browsing. Our participants also pointed out that disclosures do not explain where information related to a private browsing session gets deleted from, and when. Contributions. Our primary contributions are:
• We conduct the first qualitative user study to explore why most users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing. We do so by conducting an interview-based study with users and non-users of private mode. We explore users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals, and how these models influence users' understanding and usage of private browsing mode.
• We perform the first participatory design study to improve the design of browser disclosures (related to private browsing mode). Prior work [25, 29, 55] has suggested that existing browser disclosures should be redesigned to better convey the actual protections of private browsing. In this paper, we do so by asking our participants to critique the browser disclosures of Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome, explain why these disclosures do not communicate the benefits and limitations of private browsing to end-users, and then help design new ones.
• We distill a set of design recommendations that we encourage browser designers to implement and test, in order to design more effective browser disclosures.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we explain private browsing and its security goals in Section 2. We then introduce our study methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our key results. In Section 5, we discuss our results, and then propose a set of design recommendations to improve the design of browser disclosures. Finally, we survey existing literature in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7.
Background
Private browsing is a privacy-enhancing technology that allows the user to browse the Internet without locally saving information (e.g., browsing history, cookies) about the websites they visited in private mode [2] . Nowadays, all major web browsers support private browsing. Different browsers refer to it using different names. [48] . Private browsing goals. The primary security goal of private browsing is that a local attacker -such as a family member, a friend, or a work colleague -who takes control of the user's machine after the user exits a private browsing session should find no evidence of the websites the user visited in that session [2] . That is, a local attacker who has (physical or remote) access to the user's machine at time T should learn nothing about the user's private browsing activities prior to time T. Therefore, private browsing does not protect against a local attacker who controls the user's machine before or during a private browsing session; a motivated attacker (e.g., a suspicious wife) can install a keylogger or a spyware and monitor the user's (e.g., husband's) private browsing activities. Further, private browsing does not aim to protect against a web attacker who, unlike a local attacker, does not control the user's machine but controls the websites visited by the user in private mode [2] . Even if the user is not authenticated, a website can uniquely identify them through their client's IP address. Also, the user's various browser features -such as screen resolution, timezone, and installed extensions -can easily enable browser fingerprinting [2] and, hence, website tracking.
Additionally, private browsing does not aim to hide the user's private browsing activities from their browser vendor, Internet service provider (ISP), employer, or government.
To achieve the primary security goal of private browsing, once a user terminates a private browsing session, most web browsers claim to delete the user's private browsing history, cookies, information entered in forms (e.g., login data, search items), and temporary files from the user's local device. Further, some browsers do not locally store the bookmarks created and files downloaded in a private browsing session. vacy features to help reduce website tracking (although protecting against website tracking is not a security goal of private browsing). Brave has recently added onion routing (Tor) as an option to its private tabs [48] . Further, Firefox disables third-party cookies to stop some types of tracking by advertisers [22] . Opera also supports a VPN service [38] . Additionally, most implementations of private browsing are imperfect. Prior work in the field of computer forensics has found residual artifacts that remain on the user's local machine (after the user terminates their private browsing session) that could be used to identify the user's private browsing activities [36, 37, 44] . For example, Ohana and Shashidhar were able to recover all cached images, URL history, and usernames (with their associated accounts) from RAM and memory dumps for browsing activities performed in Internet Explorer's InPrivate mode (version 8.0) [37] . Further, browser extensions add complexity to private browsing [2, 33, 56] . In [2] , Aggrawal et al. showed how different browser extensions in both Google Chrome (version 5.0) and Firefox (version 3.5) could pose a privacy risk to users by leaving traces of their private browsing activities on their local device. For further attacks, we refer the reader to [2] .
Although these attacks are crucial to consider in order to achieve overall browser security, they are not the focus of our work. In this paper, we investigate users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals. We also investigate why existing browser disclosures do not communicate the benefits and limitations of private browsing, and how to improve the design of browser disclosures.
Methodology
To explore why most users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing, we designed and conducted a two-part user study -(1) a qualitative, interviewbased study and (2) a participatory design study -with 20 demographically-diverse participants between August 2018 and September 2018. In this section, we discuss the research questions we address in our work, recruitment process, study procedure, details of our data analysis, and limitations of our work.
Research Questions
In this paper, we answer the following research questions:
• RQ1: How do users perceive the term "private browsing?"
• RQ2: What are users' mental models of private browsing (as a privacy-enhancing technology) and its security goals?
• RQ3: How do users perceive those who use private browsing? Do users perceive the routine use of private browsing as "paranoid" or "unnecessary?"
• RQ4: How do users' mental models and perceptions influence their usage of private browsing?
• RQ5: Why do existing browser disclosures (related to private browsing) misinform users of the benefits and limitations of private browsing?
• RQ6: How can the computer security and privacy community improve the design of browser disclosures?
Recruitment
In this work, our focus is to understand how mainstream users perceive private browsing and its security goals. This understanding is crucial to design browser disclosures that sufficiently inform the general public of the benefits and limitations of private browsing. We do not investigate how a specific at-risk user group -such as activists, journalists, or whistle-blowers -perceive and use private browsing. However, we have documented our study protocol step-by-step, meaning that it can be replicated with different user groups in varying contexts.
To recruit our participants, we posted flyers and distributed leaflets in London (UK). We asked interested participants to complete an online screening questionnaire, which about 500 completed. We aimed to recruit a demographically-diverse sample of participants. Hence, we included a number of demographic questions about gender, age, race, educational level, and employment status. We also assessed participants' technical knowledge; we considered participants as technical if two out of three of the following were true [51] : (1) participants had an education in, and/or worked in, the field of computer science, computer engineering, or IT; (2) they were familiar with or an expert in at least one programming language (e.g., C++); (3) people usually asked them for computer-related advice. Further, we provided participants with a list of different web browsers, and then asked which browsers they used, what they used each browser for (in case they used multiple browsers), which browser they used the most, and how many hours they spent daily on their desktop and mobile phone browsing.
Additionally, we asked participants to list the digital security requirements they had at school or work, how often they received cybersecurity training, and whether they felt at risk due to their school work or job duties. In [26] , Gaw et al. found that people perceived the "universal, routine use of encryption as paranoid." In this work, we aimed to explore whether our participants perceived the everyday use of private browsing as paranoid and unnecessary.
We conducted and analyzed 10 unstructured interviews first (to help us design the study script, which we explain in detail in Section 3.3), followed by 20 semi-structured interviews (our study's main interviews).
Study Procedure
A trained researcher conducted all interviews in the UK in English, by first conducting 10 unstructured (open-ended) face-to-face interviews (lasting for 60 minutes on average each) (see Table 2 ). The emerging themes from these 10 interviews helped us design the study script we used to conduct our main interviews: 20 semi-structured face-to-face interviews (lasting for 90 minutes on average each) (see Table 4 in Section 4). When conducting the semi-structured interviews, the interviewer allowed participants to share their thoughts and ask any clarification questions. Further, the interviewer probed where appropriate, which is a common practice in semi-structured interviews -the interviewer uses a list of questions (i.e., a study script), but can ask followup questions as well as skip questions that have already been covered. Below, we describe our study script.
To answer our research questions (see Section 3.1), we designed and conducted a two-part user study with 20 demographically-diverse participants (both users and nonusers of private browsing mode): (1) a qualitative, interviewbased study to explore users' mental models of private Table 2 : Unstructured interview participant demographics.
browsing and its security goals, and how these models influence users' understanding and usage of private mode; (2) a participatory design study to investigate why existing browser disclosures -the in-browser explanations of private browsing -do not communicate the actual benefits and limitations of private browsing. We also sought to solicit new disclosure designs from our participants. Part 1: Exploring Mental Models and Usage. First, we aimed to answer RQ1-RQ4 (see Section 3.1), by qualitatively investigating participants' mental models of private browsing and its security goals, as well as exploring how participants perceived those who (regularly or occasionally) use private browsing. We also aimed to understand how participants' mental models and perceptions influenced their understanding and usage of private mode.
1) Hence, we asked participants whether they had heard of the term "private browsing," and, if so, whether they felt confident explaining what it meant. We then asked them to explain what it meant to browse privately. We provided participants with a large pad of paper and a 24-colour pack of markers, giving them the option to draw their mental models of private browsing. Further, we asked participants to describe the benefits and drawbacks, if any, of browsing privately.
By asking these questions, we aimed to investigate participants' conceptual understanding of the term "private browsing," and how this understanding influenced their mental models and usage of private mode (as a privacy-enhancing technology), as we describe in detail next.
2) After exploring participants' general mental models of the term "private browsing," we asked participants whether they had browsed in private mode and, if so, whether they felt confident explaining what it meant to open a private tab or window. We then asked them to explain the difference, if any, between default (non-private) browsing mode and private browsing mode.
3) We also aimed to understand how participants perceived the security goals of private browsing. Hence, we asked them about the entities, if any, that could learn about their private browsing activities (e.g., visited websites in private mode), and how. We wanted to explore whether participants understood the primary security goal of private browsing: protecting against a local attacker who takes control of a user's ma-chine after the user exits private browsing (see Section 2).
4) Further, we asked participants to explain how they perceived those who would be interested in browsing in private mode. We aimed to investigate whether participants perceived the use of private mode as paranoid or unnecessary.
5)
We then asked participants to describe what they expected from private mode. We also investigated whether participants' familiarity with private mode affected the robustness of their mental models. Therefore, we asked participants to list the web browsers they regularly used (as well as those they did not necessarily use) and that they considered having a private mode that met their expectations.
6) Finally, we aimed to explore how participants' mental models and perceptions influenced their usage of private mode. Hence, we asked participants who used, or had used in the past, private mode to share their private browsing habits.
We asked them what they used private mode for, how often they used it, and where they used it. We also asked them to explain what they liked and disliked about private mode. Part 2: Designing Better Browser Disclosures.
After exploring our participants' mental models and usage of private browsing, we aimed to investigate why browser disclosures (related to private browsing) do not communicate the actual benefits and limitations of private browsing. We also sought to improve the design of existing browser disclosures. Hence, we performed a participatory design study to solicit new disclosure designs from our participants.
1) To answer RQ5 and RQ6 (see Section 3.1), we first asked our participants to take a short quiz to further test their knowledge of private browsing. We asked them to answer the following questions about a private browsing mode that works properly:
• Private mode hides my browsing activities from [browser vendor].
• If I visited a website in private mode, the website would not be able to determine whether I was browsing in private or public mode.
• After I exited private mode, a family member would not be able to learn about my activities in private mode.
• Before I start browsing in private mode, a family member will not be able to learn about the websites I plan to visit in private mode.
• Private mode encrypts information I send and receive while browsing in private mode.
• Private mode hides my browsing activities from my school or employer.
• Private mode hides my identity from websites I visit.
2)
We also asked participants whether they were familiar with the following items that appear on almost all of today's browser disclosures, and whether they felt confident explaining what each item meant: browsing history file, cookies, search items, bookmarks, downloads, and temporary files.
3) We then gave participants a 15-minute tutorial, explaining the primary security goal of private browsing, the difference between default browsing mode and private browsing mode, and why private browsing does not protect against website fingerprinting and, hence, website tracking and ad targeting. Further, we explained the different items/files that most web browsers claim to delete once a user exits private mode (see Section 2). We also explained the different privacy features that have been recently added by some web browsers (e.g., Brave's Private Tabs with Tor). Finally, we explained the difference between a private tab, a private window, and a private session.
4) To assess whether participants' knowledge of private browsing had improved after the tutorial, we asked participants to take the same quiz we gave them previously. However, we shuffled the questions to minimize bias.
5)
We then asked participants to critique existing browser disclosures (using the knowledge they acquired from the tutorial). We sought to get feedback on three disclosures, as well as solicit new disclosure designs from participants. Hence, we asked each participant to critique the browser disclosures of three web browsers: Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome (see Figures 1, 2, and 3) . To minimize bias, disclosures were assigned to each participant randomly. We chose these three disclosures because Firefox and Chrome were the most frequently-used browsers by our participants. Further, Brave was launched with privacy as a key selling point. We showed participants one disclosure at a time. We then asked them to describe what they felt about the disclosure, how useful they felt the explanation was, what about the explanation would make them decide to use or not use private mode, and what else they would like the disclosure to tell them or elaborate on. We gave participants green and red markers to highlight what they liked and disliked about the disclosure. We then showed participants the second disclosure and followed-up by asking the same questions we asked about the first disclosure they saw. We also asked participants to compare the second disclosure to the first one, and then explain whether they would be more or less likely to use private mode if they saw this disclosure or the prior one. Additionally, we showed participants the third disclosure and asked them the same questions we previously asked.
6)
Finally, we performed a participatory design study to solicit new disclosure designs from our participants. We asked participants to describe private browsing as if they were explaining it to someone new to this privacy-enhancing technology. We prompted our participants as follows: "We would like you to design a browser disclosure that clearly explains the benefits and limitations of private browsing. While designing, think about what would make you use private mode, what information you would want to know, what information you would want to omit, and how you would want the disclosure to look." We gave participants a large pad of paper and a 24-colour pack of markers to design their disclosures, giving them the option to draw.
We also asked participants to share their thoughts on the following names: "Private Browsing," "InPrivate Browsing," and "Incognito Browsing," and suggest a new name, if any. 
Pilot Study
After developing the initial questionnaire of our quiz, we conducted cognitive interviews with 5 demographicallydiverse participants (see Table 3 ). Cognitive interviewing is a method used to pre-test questionnaires to glean insights into how participants might interpret and answer questions [28] . After answering each quiz question, participants were asked to share their thoughts and answer the following: "Was this question difficult to understand or answer?;" "How did answering the question make you feel?" We then used the findings to revise our quiz, and evaluate question wording and bias.
To pre-test our overall user study (screening questionnaire, study script, and quiz), we conducted a small-scale pilot study of 5 semi-structured interviews. We used the common practice of convenience sampling [28] , by selecting 5 colleagues for the pilot study. Additionally, we asked 7 computer security and privacy researchers to review the study. We used the findings to identify potential problems (e.g., time, cost, adverse events) in advance prior to conducting the full-scale study.
Data Analysis
To develop enough depth in our exploratory research, we conducted multiple rounds of interviews, punctuated with periods of analysis and tentative conclusions [14] . In total, we conducted, transcribed (using an external transcription service), and analyzed all 10 unstructured and 20 semistructured interviews. We observed data saturation [27, 47] between the 17 th and the 20 th interviews; i.e., no new themes emerged in interviews 17-20, and, hence, we stopped recruiting participants. Data saturation has attained widespread acceptance as a methodological principle in qualitative research. It is commonly taken to indicate, on the basis of the data that has been collected and analyzed, further data collection and analysis are unnecessary.
Two researchers independently coded all interview transcripts and image data using grounded theory [14] , an openended method to discover explanations, grounded in empirical data, about how things work. The researchers created two codebooks: one for the interview transcripts and one for the image data. After creating the final codebook, they tested for the inter-rater reliability (or inter-coder agreement). The average Cohen's kappa coefficient (κ) for all themes in the interview transcripts and image data was 0.77 and 0.89, re-spectively. A κ value above 0.75 is considered excellent agreement [13] .
Ethics
Our study was reviewed and approved by our organization's Research Ethics Committee. Before each interview, we asked participants to read an information sheet that explained the high-level purpose of the study and outlined our data-protection practices. We also asked participants to sign a consent form that presented all the information required in Article 14 of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Participants had the option to withdraw at any point during the study without providing an explanation. We paid each participant £30.
Limitations
Our study has a number of limitations common to all qualitative research studies. First, the quality of qualitative research mainly depends on the interviewer's individual skills. Therefore, to minimize bias, one researcher, who was trained to conduct interviews and ask questions in an open and neutral way, conducted all 5 unstructured and 20 semi-structured interviews, as well as all 5 cognitive interviews (for quiz pretesting).
Second, some participants' answers tended to be less detailed during the final 20 minutes of the interview due to interviewee fatigue and inattention [47] . However, the interviewer prompted participants to give full answers to all questions.
Third, as with all qualitative studies, our work is limited by the size and diversity of our sample. Following recommendations from prior work to interview between 12 and 20 participants [11] , we interviewed participants until new themes stopped emerging (total: 20 participants). We also recruited a demographically-diverse sample of participants in order to increase the likelihood that relevant findings have been mentioned by at least one participant.
Results
The main purpose of qualitative research is to explore a phenomenon in depth, and not to investigate whether findings are statistically significant or due to chance [28] . Although we report how many participants mentioned each finding as an indication of prevalence, our findings are not quantitative. Further, a participant failing to mention a particular finding does not imply they disagree with that finding; they might have failed to mention it due to, for example, recall bias [28] . Thus, as with all qualitative studies, our findings are not necessarily generalizable beyond our sample. However, they suggest several research avenues for future work, and can be supplemented by quantitative data. Table 4 : Semi-structured interview participant demographics.
In this section, we present the results of our 20 semistructured interview participants. Table 4 summarizes the demographics of our sample. We interviewed eight male, 10 female, and two non-binary participants. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 74. 10 identified as white, three as black, three as Asian, two as Hispanic, and two as mixed-race. Seven reported having a college (or an undergraduate) degree, and seven a graduate (or a postgraduate) degree. Two reported having high-school education, one vocational training (VOC), and three some postsecondary education (some college education without a degree). Four participants were high-school and university students, 12 employed, two unemployed, and one retired. One participant preferred not to indicate her employment status. According to the definition we used to assess our participants' technical knowledge (see Section 3.2), 15 qualified as technical.
Demographics
Our participants used a wide range of web browsers (both on desktop and mobile phone). Google Chrome was the most used browser by our participants, followed by Safari, Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Brave, respectively. Two participants (P01 and P03) used the Tor browser. We noticed younger participants regularly used (or had used in the past) multiple browsers, whereas older or less educated participants used one browser, mainly Safari due to its compatibility with Apple devices.
Participants daily spent between five and 17 hours (mean=12.3 hours) browsing the Internet. Desktop/laptop browsing overtook smartphone surfing, with the exception of three participants (P02, P12, and P16). Most participants (17 out of 20) used multiple browsers for various reasons. For example, 14 participants reported using one or two browsers for social activities and one for work-related activities. P11 further explained by saying they "did not want to pollute their work-related browsing history with some random browsing activity."
Prior user studies (mainly surveys) have aimed to understand what people use private mode for (see Table 5 in Appendix A). However, the vast majority of respondents who completed the surveys were either unaware of private mode or did not use it. In this work, we aimed to recruit both users and non-users of private mode. To minimize bias, we advertised our study broadly and with no mention of "private browsing," "private mode," or any other related term. 16 participants reported they used (or had used in the past) private mode. Two (P12 and P16) were aware of the mode, but did not use it, and two (P02 and P11) were not aware of the mode.
Finally, we note that P01, P03, and P18 identified as computer security/privacy experts. Hence, they did not necessarily represent mainstream users.
General Mental Models of "Private
Browsing"
We aimed to investigate our participants' conceptual understanding of the term "private browsing." 18 out of 20 (a clear majority) had heard of the term, and 17 felt confident explaining what the term meant. 16 out of 17 were users of (or had used in the past) private mode. One participant (P11) was a non-user. We then asked all participants to explain what "private browsing" meant to them. 5 out of 20 associated the term with private browsing mode, mentioning the following: "the window that has a man with a coat and a pair of eye glasses" (x4); "going undercover or incognito" (P04). All five participants were referring to the "Incognito Window" in Google Chrome. Further, three participants thought of the term in connection with network-encrypted communications or secure browser connections (i.e., webpages running HTTPs), two with end-to-end encrypted communications, two with anonymous communications (using Tor or VPN), and two with user authentication (both one-factor and two-factor authentication). One participant (P17) associated "private browsing" with both network encryption and authentication. Additionally, P15 described the term as the ability to browse the Internet "without getting infected with a virus."
Further, eight participants mentioned the terms "privacy" and "online privacy" to explain what "private browsing" meant to them: P01-P05, P07, and P12-P14 defined the term as having control over how users' online information is handled and shared with others. P09 and P20 referred to the term as the ability to manage and "regulate" one's social space.
In the next section, we show how participants' mental models of "private browsing" influenced their usage of private mode in real life.
Mental Models and Usage of Private Mode
After exploring our participants' conceptual understanding of the term "private browsing," we aimed to investigate how this understanding influenced participants' mental models and usage of private mode (as a privacy tool). We identified three types of users: Regular users. Two participants (P01 and P17) were regular users of private mode. They performed all their browsing activities in private mode. They described themselves as "paranoid" and "cautious." P01 mentioned that the routine use of private mode made them feel "safer" and "more comfortable." Further, P01 used Safari's private mode to protect against shoulder-surfing. They explained that Safari does not have a visual user interface element that indicates a user is currently browsing privately. However, when probed, P01 (as well as P17) did not know that staying in private mode for a long duration of time can easily enable fingerprinting and, hence, website tracking (a threat that both participants thought they were protected against by regularly browsing in private mode). Occasional users. 10 participants used private mode occasionally depending on their browsing activities and the websites they visited. They did not necessarily use the mode to visit "embarrassing websites." Many used private mode for online shopping (e.g., purchasing a surprise gift for a family member or a friend), logging into an online service using a different account, and/or debugging software. Former users. Two participants (P13 and P19) reported they had used private mode before, but stopped using it for the following reasons:
• Lack of utility. P13 stopped using private mode because they thought that web browsers did not allow extensions to run in private mode (although users can manually enable extensions in private mode in most browsers).
• Lack of usability. P13 and P19 mentioned that entries added to the history file would get deleted if they exited private mode, negatively impacting user experience. P13 also mentioned that private mode is "useless" because users could delete information about websites visited in default mode by manually clearing their browsing history file and cookies (a view shared by P12 and P16).
• Misconceptions about private mode. P13 perceived those who used private mode as people who "had something to hide" or "were up to no good," influencing P13's decision to stop using private mode because they did not want to be perceived by others in their community as "a cybercriminal" or "a terrorist." We found that this perception was shared by many participants, as we discuss later in this section.
15 participants reported they mainly used private mode in public spaces, mainly coffee shops, libraries, and airports. They also performed browsing activities they regarded as sensitive in private mode. We also found six participants who tended to use private mode to visit malicious webpages. For example, "I sometimes encounter a message that warns me from accessing a bad webpage. I usually ignore the warning and open the page in a private window . . . Feels safer!" (P14) Alarmingly, we found that all participants who identified as either regular or occasional users of private mode (total=12 participants) performed their private browsing activities while being authenticated to their personal online account (e.g., their Google or YouTube account), believing their search history would be deleted after exiting private mode).
Additionally, we found that some participants perceived those who use private mode as people who "care about their online privacy," "have something to hide" (e.g., journalists, activists, dissidents), or "are up to no good" (e.g., cybercriminals, terrorists). These inappropriate mental models and misperceptions partially explain why most users overestimate the protection private mode offers.
In summary, most participants found utility in private mode (e.g., online shopping, debugging software). However, our participants' conceptual understanding of the term "private browsing" negatively influenced their usage of private mode in real life. Many incorrectly believed that private mode could be used to send encrypted email, achieve online anonymity, or simply access a phishing webpage because it "felt safer" to do so.
Security Goals of Private Mode
We aimed to further investigate how participants perceived the security goals of private mode. Thus, we asked participants about the entities, if any, that could learn about their private browsing activities, what they could learn, and how.
All, but one participant (P03) who identified as a security/privacy expert, did not understand what private mode could and could not achieve (i.e., did not recognize the primary security goal of private browsing).
17 out of 20 participants believed that a family member, a partner/a spouse, a friend, or a work colleague would not be able to learn about the websites they visited in private mode "whatsoever" (P01). Ten mentioned that this would only be possible if the entity was "technically-sophisticated." Only P03 correctly explained that private mode protected against a local attacker after the user exited private mode.
11 participants believed that a browser vendor (e.g., Google, Microsoft) could not learn their private browsing activities, citing the following statement that appears on most browser disclosures: "[Browser vendor] won't save your information . . . " Further, seven participants believed that private mode would hide their browsing activities from the employer, six from the ISP, and six from intelligence services and governments.
As we can see, participants' perceptions partially explain why several participants perceived those who used private mode as paranoid or up to no good (see Section 4.3).
We then asked participants what they expected from private mode. Again, 19 expected that anyone who had access to their machine should find no evidence of the websites visited privately. Additionally, 10 expected that a private mode that worked properly would not link their browsing activities in private mode to those in public mode. 13 also expected that a private mode would protect them from all types of website tracking and ad targeting. Interestingly, five participants expected a website visited in private mode would not be able to determine whether the user is currently browsing privately or not.
Although some browsers, such as Brave, have added privacy features to reduce online tracking, no browser meets all participants' expectations. However, we argue that participants' expectations were high because they overestimated the benefits of private mode.
Browser Disclosure Critique
We aimed to investigate why existing browser disclosures do not communicate the actual benefits and limitations of private browsing. To further test participants' knowledge of private mode, we asked them to take a short quiz (see Section 3). Participants performed poorly with an average score of 3.21/ 7.00.
We also asked participants to explain the following items that appear on most browser disclosures: history file, cookies, and temporary files. We found that although all participants correctly described a browsing history file, most participants (17 out of 20 ) either had not heard of a cookie or a temporary file, or did not feel confident explaining what these items meant (in the context of private browsing). These findings suggest that most participants did not understand the functionality of private browsing (see Section 2), a finding recently echoed by [55] .
We then gave our participants a 15-minute tutorial, and asked them to take the same quiz again. Participants' quiz performance significantly improved (mean= 6.31/7.00), which was an indication that participants could use the knowledge they newly acquired to critique existing browser disclosures (related to private browsing) and then design new ones, as we discuss next.
Hence, we asked participants to critique the disclosures of Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome. We describe their views below:
Private mode. 17 participants criticized both Brave and Firefox for describing their private mode as "a private tab" and "a private window," respectively. Further, 13 participants pointed out that although Chrome names its private mode "Incognito," it still uses the phrase "browse privately" in the first sentence of its browser disclosure, which is "misleading." Moreover, 13 participants were confused about when information (e.g., cookies, search items) about websites visited in private mode gets deleted: after "closing a private tab?" (P03), "closing all tabs?" (P09), "closing a [private] window?" (P11), "closing a session?" (P04; P11; P13), or "shutting down a browser?" (P09; P14; P17; P20). Also, three participants questioned whether one private session would be shared across multiple tabs/windows.
We also asked participants to suggest a new name for private mode, if any. All participants came up with random names: "non-private," "everything but private," "insecure," "random mode," and "useless." Although all participants agreed that the term "private browsing" is misleading, there was no clear winner among the names they suggested.
Primary security goal. 15 participants pointed out that none of the three disclosures explained the security goal of private browsing. Seven participants pointed out that although the Chrome disclosure says that "[a user's] private browsing activity will be hidden from users sharing the same device," it does not explain that a user of the machine could easily monitor other users' activities by infecting the machine with a malware.
16 participants mentioned that browser disclosures should mention all types of attackers that could violate the security policy of private browsing. They reported that all browser disclosures mention a subset of all possible attackers, and not the complete set.
Private browsing functionality. 14 participants criticized the use of the following statement by all three disclosures: "[vendor] will save/won't save the following information: . . . " because it implies that the vendor will not save the information on their servers, and not the true meaning: the vendor will [not] save information locally on the user's device."
Further, eight participants suggested that the explanation of private browsing functionality should be deferred until the primary security goal is explained in detail, which is none of the disclosures critiqued does.
Tracking protection.
12 participants mentioned that a browser disclosure should make it clear that protecting against website tracking is not a security goal of private mode. Three participants argued that Brave has been working on reducing online tracking as a browser feature, and not as a private mode feature.
Further, four participants argued that most browser vendors do not have the incentive to implement a private browsing mode that delivers the level of privacy expected by consumers (see Section 4.4) -mainly because most web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Internet Explorer) are owned by companies (e.g., Google, Microsoft) that rely on targeting users with advertisements to generate revenue. Hence, participants explained that disclosures should not use the term "tracking protection" to advertise the use of private mode.
Chrome performed better. 13 participants perceived the Chrome browser disclosure as more informative when compared to the disclosures of Brave and Firefox, as it uses a list of bullet points to describe both private browsing functionality and attackers. In contrast, nine participants reported that the Brave and Firefox disclosures gave them the false sense that private browsing aims to protect against website tracking and ad targeting, increasing their expectations of the protection offered by private mode beyond reality. Also, eight participants mentioned they would use the private mode of Brave and Firefox to perform sensitive browsing activities (before they were given our tutorial), due to the use of the following strong statement by Brave: "Private tabs . . . always vanish when the browser is closed," and the use of the shield icon by Firefox. Participants explained that both the state-ment and the shield are misleading, and do not communicate the actual benefits of private mode.
Finally, we asked our participants to purpose new disclosure designs to better communicate the benefits and limitations of private mode in different browsers. We discuss the findings in the next section.
Discussion
The high-level description of private mode as a "private browsing tab" or a "private browsing window" is not only vague, but also misleading. Our findings suggest that users' mental models of the term "private browsing" influence their understanding and usage of private mode. Incorrect or inappropriate mental models -partially derived from this termcould lead users to overestimate the benefits of private mode. For example, some of our participants used private mode to visit webpages not running HTTPS with a valid TLS certificate, incorrectly believing that private mode encrypted Internet traffic. We also found that several participants thought of private mode in connection with end-to-end encrypted communication tools, Tor, and VPN.
Further, only one participant was confident explaining the primary security goal of private mode. The vast majority of participants incorrectly believed that private mode protected against any local attacker, without considering the scenario of a motivated local attacker who could infect a shared machine with a spyware and monitor the user's private browsing activities.
Therefore, it is critical to communicate the actual protection private mode offers. Although users might learn about private mode from peers and online articles, effective disclosures remain the vendor's most reliable channel to communicate information to users. Hence, drawing from the findings of our user study and the browser disclosure designs our participants proposed, we distill the following set of design recommendations that we encourage browser designers to implement and test, in order to design more effective disclosures related to private browsing:
Explain the primary security goal of private mode. As most of our participants pointed out, none of the three browser disclosures they critiqued explained the main security goal of private mode. Although the Google Chrome disclosure says: "Other people who use this device won't see your activity," it does not describe that a malicious user of the device could monitor the private browsing activities of other users through a spyware or a keylogger. Hence, disclosures should clearly explain that private mode only protects against an entity that takes control of the user's machine after the user exits private mode.
Explain where information about websites visited in private mode is saved. All three browser disclosures have the following statement: "[Brave; Chrome; Firefox] will not save the following information: your browsing history, . . . " However, several participants argued that this statement is misleading because it implied the information will not be stored by the browser vendor on their servers. Browser designers should consider rewriting the statement to capture the intended meaning: information will not be locally stored on the user's device. Explain when information will be deleted. Several participants pointed out that the browser disclosures of both Chrome and Firefox do not explain when information (e.g., browsing history, cookies) about the websites visited in private mode gets deleted. Further, some participants mentioned that although the Brave disclosure says: "[information] always vanish when the browser is closed," it does not clearly communicate the actual functionality of private browsing: information related to a specific private browsing session gets deleted after the user terminates that session. Thus, browser designers should better communicate when information will be removed. Explain the different types of attackers and their capabilities. Private browsing does not hide activities performed in private mode from motivated local attackers, web attackers, employers, ISPs, browser vendors, and governments (see Section 2). All three critiqued browser disclosures mention a subset of these attackers. Further, several participants mentioned that disclosures need to clearly describe the entities it can and cannot protect against before explaining the detailed functionality of private mode, as we explain next. Defer or hide the explanation of private browsing functionality. All three disclosures mention different types of files (e.g., browsing history file, cookies, temporary files) that get deleted after the user exits private mode. However, the vast majority of participants did not feel confident explaining what these files meant. Further, several participants preferred that disclosures defer (or hide) the explanation of private browsing functionality until the different types of attackers are described, which none of the critiqued disclosures does. Avoid using uncertain or misleading words. The Chrome disclosure has the following statement: "Your activity might still be visible to [the websites you visit, your employer, etc.]." according to many participants, the use of the word "might" could lead users to incorrectly believe that private mode protects against, for example, website tracking. Explain the utility of private mode. Most participants did not necessarily use private mode to visit "embarrassing websites." They used the mode to login into an online service using another account, debug/test software, or purchase a surprise gift for a family member or a friend. Hence, some participants suggested that browser disclosures should explain the utility of private mode: what the mode can be used for. Use bullet points and bold fonts. In line with prior work, most participants used bullet points in their disclosure de-signs to explain the functionality and utility of private mode. Our participants also used bold fonts to emphasize important points (mainly, the primary security goal of private mode). Notify users when authenticated. We found our participants used private mode while being authenticated to online services, incorrectly thinking their search history would get deleted as soon as they exited private mode. Several participants noted in their new designs they would like to see a mechanism warning them when they started browsing in private mode while being logged into a service. Rethink the name "private browsing".
As our findings suggest, the name "private browsing" is misleading. Most participants were "shocked" and felt "vulnerable" upon learning the actual benefits and limitations of private mode. They also suggested different names for private mode, but without a clear winner. Hence, further work should investigate a new name for private mode that would capture its proper usage.
Finally, we encourage browser designers to consider the recommendations we proposed, and design various browser disclosure prototypes. The prototypes can then be validated through designing and conducting future user studies.
6 Related Work
User Studies of Private Browsing
Prior work has quantitatively (mainly through survey studies) investigated whether users are aware of private browsing, what they use it for, and whether they understand what protection it provides. In [25] , Gao et al. conducted a survey of 200 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) respondents in the US, examining their private browsing habits. They found that one-third of respondents were not aware of private browsing. Those who had used private browsing reported using it for protecting personal information, online shopping, or visiting "embarrassing websites." Further, most respondents had misconceptions about private browsing -such as incorrectly believing that private mode protects from visited websites. Gao et al. concluded that browsers do not effectively inform users of the benefits and limitations of private browsing, and that "browser designers [should think of] various ways to [better] inform users."
In 2017, DuckDuckGo, an Internet search engine, surveyed a sample of 5,710 US respondents, recruited via SurveyMonkey [16] . Respondents were asked to share their experiences with private browsing. One-third of respondents reported they had not heard of private browsing. Of those who had used private browsing, one-third used it frequently, and three-quarters were not able to accurately identify the benefits of private browsing. The report did not offer any recommendations beyond the study.
Using a similar study to [16] , Bursztein ran an online survey of 200 US respondents (via Google Consumer Surveys) in 2017 [10] . He found about one-third of surveyed respondents did not know about private browsing. Of those who were aware of the technology, only 20% had used it. Further, about one-half preferred not to disclose what they used private browsing for. Additionally, only 40% claimed they used private browsing for its intended purpose: leaving no traces of the websites visited in private mode on the local machine. Bursztein concluded that the computer security and privacy community should raise awareness of what private browsing can and cannot achieve among mainstream users.
Recently, Wu et al. surveyed 460 US respondents through MTurk [55] . Respondents were randomly assigned one of 13 different browser disclosures. Based on the disclosure they saw, respondents were asked to answer a set of questions to assess their understanding of private browsing. Wu et al. found current browser disclosures do not sufficiently inform users of the benefits and limitations of private browsing. They concluded that browser disclosures should be redesigned to better convey the actual protections of private browsing. They also argued that the term "private browsing" is misleading. In this work, we explore how users' conceptual understanding of the terms "online privacy" and "private browsing" influences users' understanding and usage of private mode.
Habib et al. conducted a user study to observe the private browsing behaviour of over 450 US participants using software monitoring [29] . They also explored discrepancies between observed and self-reported private browsing behaviours through a follow-up survey (using MTurk). They found participants used private browsing for a wide range of reasons -such as online shopping and logging into an online service. Further, the primary use cases of private browsing were consistent across the observed and self-reported data. Habib et al. found that participants overestimated the benefits of private browsing, concluding by supporting "changes to private browsing disclosures." Summary.
Prior work (summarized in Table 5 in Appendix A) has employed quantitative methods (mainly surveys) to investigate users' habits of private browsing as well as their understanding of its benefits and limitations. However, prior work has not investigated why users misunderstand private browsing. In this work, we do so by conducting a qualitative, interview-based study with users and non-users of private browsing. We seek to explore users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals, and how these models influence users' understanding and usage of private browsing mode. We then use the insights gleaned from the qualitative study to conduct a participatory design study to solicit new browser disclosure designs from our participants.
Security and Privacy Design
Within web browsers, prior work has investigated the design of alert messages and warnings [3, 15, [17] [18] [19] 21, 49, 50] , browser security indicators [20, 24, 45] , site trustworthiness [12, 39] , privacy policies [52, 54] , storage policies [53] , and ad personalization [32] .
However, prior work has heavily focused on the design of warning messages -especially phishing warnings [3, 15, 17, 18] and SSL warnings [3, 19, 21, 49, 50] -in order to capture users' attention, improve their comprehension, and warn them away from danger. For example, Egelman et al. recommended that phishing warning messages should be active (i.e., interrupt the user flow) and should be distinguishable by severity [17] . They also suggested it should be difficult for users to click-through phishing warnings, by requiring users to bypass several screens in an attempt to dissuade users from ignoring warnings. Additionally, Egelman and Schechter showed that changes to the look and feel of phishing warnings have resulted in more users noticing them [18] . Felt et al. recommended warning designers use opinionated design to improve user adherence to warnings [19] .
Further, several researchers have focused on reducing user habituation to security warnings [4, 7, 30] . Brustoloni and Villamarin-Salomon suggested the use of polymorphic and audited dialogues [9] . Bravo-Lillo et al. explored the use of attractors [8] . Anderson et al. varied size, colour, and option order [5] .
Summary.
The aforementioned work has mainly focused on the design of browser warning messages to improve their efficacy. However, our study focuses on designing browser disclosures that sufficiently inform users of the benefits and limitations of a privacy-enhancing technology (private browsing). Although we draw inspiration from this work, we answer a different important question of how to design browser disclosures to help users appropriately use private browsing mode. We do so by employing participatory design [46] , asking participants to critique existing browser disclosures and design new ones. Unlike warning designers who have explored different ideas -such as changing the design of a warning message or using attractors -to improve user attention to and comprehension of browser disclosures, we choose, in this paper, to engage users in the design of browser disclosures (related to private browsing).
Conclusion
In this work, we investigated why most users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing mode. We did so by designing and conducting a two-part user study with 20 demographically-diverse participants. We first conducted a qualitative, interview-based study to explore users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals. We then performed a participatory design study to investigate whether existing browser disclosures inform users of the security goals of private browsing. Two key findings are: (1) the vast majority of participants had incorrect mental models of private browsing, influencing their understanding and usage of private browsing mode; (2) existing browser disclosures are misleading and insufficiently inform users of the actual protection private browsing provides (i.e., the primary security goal of private browsing). Drawing from the findings of our user study, we distill a set of design recommendations that we encourage browser designers to implement and test, in order to design more effective browser disclosures.
A A Summary of Prior Work • How often do people use private browsing?
• Does the type of the web browser influence how often people use private browsing?
• What do people use private browsing for?
• Aggarwal et al. performed the first measurement study to monitor people's private browsing usage in four browsers (Firefox, Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Safari) on three different types of websites (adult, online shopping, and news).
• The measurement software detected if a website was visited in public or private mode.
• They ran three simultaneous one-day campaigns targeting adult, gift shopping, and news websites.
• They collected 155,226 impressions.
• Participants often used private browsing to visit adult websites, and not online shopping or news websites.
• 
